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This paper investigates the effects of globalization on Japanese young adults from sociolog-
ical and psychological perspectives. While Japan’s socio-economic institutions have shown
mainly resistant (or “hot”) reactions to globalization, individual-level adaptations remain ori-
ented toward conformity to dominant life expectations, which remain largely unchanged,
despite decreasing rewards. However, a socially withdrawn sub-group (the so-called hikiko-
mori) appears to be unable to conform yet is also unwilling to rebel. The experimental
evidence we review suggests such youth deviate from typical Japanese motivational pat-
terns but have not necessarily become more Western. This poses serious problems in an
interdependence-oriented culture, but the paralysis of this group seems to be an outcome
of labor market change rather than a psychopathology. Finally, we also identify a contrast-
ing group – whom we call the quiet mavericks – that adapts in creative and integrative
(or “cool”) ways by negotiating conformist pressures tactfully. Our account sheds light
on just how complex and painful the psychological and sociological effects of globaliza-
tion can be for young people in conformist societies, with implications to policy and social
sustainability.
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The American anthropologist Clifford Geertz famously argued
that the Western conception of the person as “a bounded, unique,
more or less integrated motivational, and cognitive universe,”
clearly set apart from other individuals as well as social context,
is a “rather peculiar idea in the context of the world’s cultures”
(Geertz, 1984, p. 126). A recent review of relevant cross-cultural
psychological studies has empirically verified the specificity of this
disembedded idea of the person (Henrich et al., 2010). However,
few psychologically oriented studies have examined what happens
when this peculiar but dominant idea is imposed on a non-Western
society through globalization-related processes. Do we find stark
resistance to such cultural change on the societal and individual
levels, or can we detect convergence with the West (see Chiu and
Cheng, 2007)? How do dominant motivations and behaviors begin
to shift?
To address these broad questions, this article investigates in
detail the consequences of globalization to youth in Japan. Glob-
alization, while a multi-layered phenomenon often associated with
greater global interconnectedness, is used here mainly to refer to
the pressures that promote a shift toward de-regulated, flexible
labor markets. This is a structural shift with intimate links to
the “global values” of consumerism, individualism, competition,
and efficiency (Pilkington and Johnson, 2003). We focus on youth
not only due to the difficulty of examining a larger demographic
slice of the population, but because it can reasonably be expected
that, lacking labor market experience and related resources, young
adults in their 20s are likely to feel the pressures of globalization
more directly and acutely than many other age-groups1. While
not its main objective, this paper is therefore relevant to under-
standing the contours of “emerging adulthood” (Arnett, 2004) in
Japan in relation to the sphere of work especially. The specific
puzzle we pursue is: how are Japanese youth adapting their moti-
vational processes and behaviors amid contradictory cultural and
socio-economic pressures?
We have chosen to investigate Japan because, while economi-
cally similar to western countries, it represents a prototypical“con-
formist” society. To avoid confusion, conformism as an attribute
of a given society implies, drawing on Mertonian sociological
thinking related to the concept of anomie (Merton, 1949), the
inseparability of culturally defined, dominant success goals, and
culturally approved institutional means. In a conformist society,
therefore, acquiescence to respected protocols, roles, and insti-
tutionalized life paths tends to be so important that “success”
does not exist independent of such legitimate means, at least for
those who subscribe to mainstream values. Cultural psychologi-
cal studies have shown that, in conformist environments, social
structures and practices motivate individuals to adjust the self to
the situation (as opposed to influencing it); maintain social har-
mony (instead of disrupting it by standing out); and to affirm
one’s interdependence with others (rather than asserting one’s
1Immigrants as well as the broader issues of international mobility and social inclu-
sion are clearly part of globalization too, but our focus on youth in the homogeneous
context of mainstream Japan leads us to discuss such issues only tangentially.
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FIGURE 1 |The share of 20- to 29-year-olds and those aged 60 and
above relative to Japan’s total population (1950–2010, with projections
for 2020 and 2050). Sources: Statistics Bureau (http://www.stat.go.jp/data/
jinsui/2.htm) and Japan Aging Research Center (http://www.jarc.net/aging/
jp/06feb/060203JARC_Population.pdf). Accessed on January 20, 2011.
independence; see Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Kitayama and
Uchida, 2003). It is easy to see from here that the potential
for tension between Japanese cultural tendencies and the above-
mentioned “global values” is enormous. Though certain quali-
fications need to be made, Japan remains a conformist society
par excellence where, due central cultural features as well as the
coincidence of seniority-based hierarchies (Nakane, 1970) and
accelerating demographic aging (see Figure 1), conformist pres-
sures remain strong, especially in the labor market sphere. All this
makes Japan a particularly interesting – and challenging – con-
text for studying the impacts of US-led globalization on young
people.
To unravel the impacts of globalization on young people’s
motivational processes and behaviors, this account investigates
(1) Japan’s responses to globalization on an institutional regu-
latory level, with a focus on the youth labor markets; (2) dom-
inant individual-level adaptations to globalization in a changed
labor market environment; and (3) the responses of distinc-
tive groups of youth. On a theoretical level, we interpret our
findings with reference to Cheng and Chiu’s (2010) model of
psychological reactions to globalization. In their scheme, “emo-
tional, reflexive responses evoked by perceived threats to the
integrity of one’s heritage cultural identity” are conceptualized
as “hot” reactions (Cheng and Chiu, 2010, p. 8). They typically
lead to xenophobic behaviors that attack and try to quarantine
offensive elements, including “global values” as mentioned above.
On the other hand, “cool” reactions, while not equivalent to an
uncritical espousal of global (predominantly western) influences,
denote “reflective mental processes that facilitate the use of ideas
from foreign cultures as means to further one’s valued goals”
(Cheng and Chiu, 2010, p. 11)2. When reacting “coolly,” indi-
viduals (and the institutions they steer) utilize foreign cultural
2This formulation of “cool” reactions has close affinities with Inglehart’s “post-
materialist values” (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) and with the values of Florida’s
“creative class” (Florida, 2002), both of which emphasize the tolerance of diversity
and openness to new ideas.
inputs as intellectual resources to promote their own cultur-
ally specific goals, yielding syntheses. Put differently, compared
to resistant hot reactions, cool reactions are selectively integra-
tive of old and new elements. What Cheng and Chiu’s model
pays less attention to is the possible avoidance of explicit reac-
tions altogether, which we find is in some cases relevant. In any
case, one sub-text of their theory seems to be that hot reactions
lead to tensions and even national or individual decline, while
cool approaches facilitate more “successful” adaptations to glob-
alization. It is therefore of great significance to understand the
dynamics and consequences of hot vs. cool reactions in different
societies.
Taking into account the above, our sociological and psycholog-
ical data suggests the following: First, Japan’s youth labor market
institutions have responded to globalization in a predominantly
“hot”fashion as conservative elites have resisted reforming the core
of the employment system – still a central cultural symbol. Second,
young labor market entrants have borne the brunt of resulting bur-
dens, with a growing group (“ritualists”; see below) conforming
to dominant social expectations but without enjoying expected
rewards. Another more withdrawn group (“retreatists”) suffers
deeper isolation partly due to distinctive psychologies that deviate
from both typical Japanese and western motivational patterns. Our
findings challenge existing research on such so-called hikikomori
(as withdrawn youth are now called in Japan and internationally)
by showing that this phenomenon is to be understood neither in
terms of a psychopathology, essentialized notions of Japanese cul-
ture nor resistance to those with individualistic values, but as a
product of social change interacting with psychological processes.
Third, there indeed is a general tendency among Japanese peo-
ple toward avoidance motivations, but this does not mean active
non-conformism is entirely absent: we also identify an emerging
layer of youth (“quiet mavericks”) who possess the cultural and
social agility to utilize global influences without being defeated by
conformist pressures. Most analysts of Japan, building on western
assumptions, have tended to ignore all but the loudest forms of
resistance (e.g., demonstrations, movements, and explicitly rebel-
like individuals), and the most controversial media-driven youth
problems (see Goodman et al., 2011). Incidentally however, it may
be precisely this less visible, quieter stratum that most effectively
renegotiates seemingly contradictory cultural pressures in the
Japanese context, so exemplifying“cool”reactions to globalization.
LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS: “HOT” REACTIONS
We begin by considering how and to what extent the Japanese
youth labor markets have been modified in the face of global-
ization in the 1990s and 2000s. Globalization’s effects on young
people’s motivational processes must be approached in this way,
for they are never direct but proceed through various institutional
“filters” (Mills and Blossfeld, 2005, p. 6). One would expect the
labor markets, when reformed after Western models, to be a key
conduit for the transmission of values such as competitiveness and
individualism.
As opposed to the so-called liberal market economies (LMEs) –
characterized by labor markets that are lightly regulated and of
which the US is a prime example – Japan has been identified
as a coordinated market economy (CME; Hall and Gingerich,
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2009). Such CMEs are said to feature stronger labor market reg-
ulations and institutionalized wage-bargaining procedures, one
consequence of which is lower labor mobility and the strong pro-
tection of status-based advantages. CMEs have frequently been
viewed as inflexible, resistant to reform and highly challenged
by American-style globalization and post-industrialization. While
somewhat different to CMEs such as Germany and Finland in
terms of relationship of the state and private firms, Japan has
shared many of these features: for instance, it has been nearly
impossible, in a both legal and normative sense, for employers to
lay off core workers. At the same time, a large buffer of marginal
workers – comprising housewives as well as male day-laborers –
has long co-existed in Japan with the protected core. How did these
institutions react when globalization pressures, including the per-
ceived necessity to cut labor costs amid low growth, hit them with
full force in the 1990s?3
The best way to sum up the response of Japan to globalization
pressures is to say that its labor markets were reformed significantly
but in a covertly asymmetric fashion: Japan’s senior government
and business elites of the older generation resisted pressures for
change by protecting the classic long-term employment system –
a central cultural symbol – by confining reforms to an expanding
peripheral labor force dominated by new entrants into the labor
market, thereby blocking much of the potential that youth have
to offer to innovative ideas and strategies that can contribute to
increased competitiveness in the global marketplace (see Weathers,
2001; Gottfried, 2008, p. 189; Genda, 2005)4. In terms of Cheng
and Chiu’s conceptualization, this amounts to a “hot” reaction to
globalization. Non-standard employment such as short-term con-
tract work proliferated in tandem with rising levels of education
(Kariya, 2011) as Japan further de-industrialized and shed rela-
tively stable manufacturing jobs in the 1990s and 2000s (Rebick,
2005). This has had detrimental consequences to many youth in
the context of a one-shot recruitment system where those not hired
immediately upon graduation from high school or university are
very rarely allowed to enter the core workforce at a later stage
(Kosugi, 2008).
By contrast, in the US the labor markets are de-regulated and
kept flexible throughout so that all workers are to some extent dis-
missable, which is advantageous to companies when they need to
reduce labor costs or shed workers who are no longer required by
them. In Japan, the continued cultural centrality of the long-term
employment system has led to an increasingly divided situation
where those who fail to enter it are generally considered inferior
in terms of status – as if they were contaminants to be kept in the
margins so as to not taint a system that is itself pure. It is primarily
3Japan experienced a major real estate bubble up to 1991, the burst of which ushered
in a decade-long recession that saw the country’s GDP growth rate sink from 3.4%
in 1991 to −2% in 1998, after which growth recovered only modestly. This recession
generated enormous pressures to rapidly reform the Japanese economy.
4The total share of non-standard workers (hiseiki-shain) leapt from just 20% in
1990 to 34% in 2010 (Statistics Bureau, 2011) – a nearly 60% increase. For 15- to
24-year-olds, there was an even greater increase from 21 to 46% (of which a third
were working while in education), though many more out-of-school females (36%)
than males (26%) found themselves in this category. For 25- to 34-year-old women,
the rates were even higher at 41% working non-standard jobs in 2010 compared to
only 14% of males.
this de-regulated section of the labor force that has been called
to espouse new values by being more “self-directed” (shutaiteki)
and “self-responsible” (jikosekinin wo motsu), whereas protected
core workers are generally expected to conform to entrenched cul-
tural codes (though mobility has risen here too). Sadly for the
younger group, genuine alternative paths to economic autonomy,
and social security – including support toward entrepreneurial
activity – have remained extremely limited. The next section con-
siders the implications this situation has had for young people’s
behaviors and motivational processes.
DOMINANT INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ADAPTATIONS
While Japan’s central labor market institutions strongly resisted
globalization pressures in the 1990s and 2000s, young people have
been forced to function within a reformed institutional landscape.
The key dilemma herein has been that, even as labor markets have
grown significantly less secure, general cultural attitudes and social
security policies have continued to strongly favor those in per-
manent long-term employment, to which various financial and
status-related benefits mainly accrue. The dominant life-course
ideal still consists of a steady progression from an excellent high
school and tertiary institution into a large company, leading to ris-
ing wages that enable family formation (Chiavacci, 2008), despite
the fact that fewer and fewer young labor market entrants can
now hope to meet this ideal in practice5. To be sure, the Japan-
ese public debate in the 2000s tended to suggest that the values
of teenagers and 20-something had significantly changed com-
pared to their parents’ generation, moving away from hard work
and company loyalty toward self-actualization or a slower pace of
living. However, academic research has shown that this view has,
by and large, been exaggerated and that economic stagnation and
institutional dynamics far better explain young people’s rapidly
changing labor market behaviors (Kariya and Rosenbaum, 2003;
Genda, 2005)6. Reflected in the rising popularity of striving for a
career as a public servant, most (though not all) youth indeed still
hold relatively conservative life-course expectations and remain
security-oriented (Yamada, 2011). In a context where the state has
not stepped in to compensate for the loss of labor market secu-
rity and company-based welfare it remains rational for youth to
seek economic security as well as adult status through competing
for positions in large organizations. Indeed, a bivariate regression
analysis of panel data suggests that the link between graduating
from an elite university and securing a job in a large corporation
is now stronger than ever (Kariya, 2011).
How have youth adapted their behaviors and motivations
in this conflicting situation where socially accepted routes to
5Some important gender differences have marked these life-course expectations,
with housewifery having been a major cultural goal for women up to the 1980s.
Since then, women’s expectations have begun to converge with males’, with the
majority of women wishing to combine paid work and family duties, though most
still feel they have to choose between one or the other toward their late 20s and early
30s (Schoppa, 2006).
6This is not to say that value change has been completely absent or that genera-
tions do not clash over life-course goals. Brinton (2011) highlights precisely this
issue when she notes that older generations’ rigid ideals, accompanied by blind-
ness to post-industrial social changes, may be one factor deepening the problems of
Japanese youth.
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Table 1 |The adaptive categories available to youth in relation to dominant cultural success goals and legitimate institutional means. (Examples
from Japan marked with an asterisk).
Adaptive category Relationship to dominant goals and means
Conformists Conform to goals and are able to access legitimate means; can hope to enjoy culturally expected rewards. *For example,
middle-class “salarymen” at large corporations.
Innovators Reach toward dominant goals through innovative, less legitimate means; may enjoy culturally expected rewards. *Absent
from conformist societies where goals and means are intertwined.
Ritualists Conform to legitimate means but have little hope for culturally expected rewards. *The default adaptation in conformist
societies. For example, those among non-standard workers (freeters) who hold middle-class expectations.
Retreatists Disillusioned with both dominant goals and means; disengage from mainstream society in various ways; receive no
rewards; burdened by stigma. *For example socially withdrawn hikikomori and workless “NEETs.”
(Quiet) mavericks Create original goals as well as means; engage with society on their own terms. The main group driving social change.
*Includes rebellion but also “quieter” and tactful forms of resistance, especially in conformist societies. For example
(social) entrepreneurs, activists.
adulthood are much harder to access? To theoretically ground our
analysis, we construct a framework modeled on Merton’s classic
sociological typology of individual adaptations to anomie (Mer-
ton, 1938, 1949). This framework is necessarily a simplification
but it allows us to expand our analytical scope beyond particular
“problem youth” groups while situating such groups sociologically
(which is something most studies on Japanese youth do not do sys-
tematically; see, e.g., Zielenziger, 2006). Also, it lets us set in wider
context the cultural psychological findings to be reviewed later.
It is important to note that we are not predominantly attempt-
ing to explain criminally deviant behavior – nor do we deny the
limitations of anomie theory – but find it an effective tool for shed-
ding light on the disjunction between culturally designated goals
and legitimate institutional means that greatly affects Japanese
youth at present. Although Mertonian approaches are sometimes
criticized as rigidly functionalist (see Toivonen and Imoto, 2011),
what we construct is an empirically grounded middle-range the-
ory that allows for movement between distinctive social locations
and that does not deny the role of agency in effecting social
change.
According to Merton, in any human society, most people are
“conformists”who aspire toward culturally dominant success goals
through accepted institutional means (e.g., education and paid
work in legitimate occupations). Meanwhile, those unable or
unwilling to conform on one or both of these counts become
either “innovators,” “ritualists,” “retreatists,” or “rebels,” the latter
of which we have reframed as “(quiet) mavericks” for reasons to
be explained (see Table 1).
Before applying this framework to Japan, two specifications are
necessary. First, though most analysts would agree that the degree
of social conformity is high in Japan, we assume that only those who
self-identify as being part of the middle-class subscribe strongly to
the dominant success goals and life-course expectations pointed
out above. Approximately 90% of Japanese fulfill this condition
(Cabinet Office, 2007). In this account, we focus on understand-
ing adaptations within this majority group that can be assumed
to be almost entirely ethnically Japanese. More heterogeneous and
truly marginal parts of the population (e.g., ethnic minorities, the
homeless, members of religious and criminal organizations, others
who exist outside the confines of mainstream Japanese society) fall
outside the scope of our analysis, not because they are unimportant
but because the social and cultural dynamics that apply to such
groups are different.
Second, the category of “innovators” makes much less sense
in the context of Japanese society, since it presupposes that cul-
tural goals and institutional means are essentially separable from
each other. Members of the Japanese middle-class society pos-
sess strong expectations regarding how life-courses should unfold,
with the consequence, as explained above, that any notion of suc-
cess is intertwined with adherence to certain legitimate means and
social roles. This stands in marked contrast to the US case where,
as Merton himself surmised, innovation – the application of less
recognized or even illegitimate means so as to attain economic
success – is an important response in situations where the dis-
tance between dominant goals and legitimate means for reaching
toward such goals seems wide. In Japan, with innovation remain-
ing a possibility only to those not steeped in middle-class values,
we posit that there is an inbuilt tendency for ritualism to be the
default behavioral alternative to conformism. (The psychological
reasons for this tendency will be reviewed in the next section.)
For this group, abiding by acceptable behavioral norms still pro-
vides significant social rewards even as the expected economic or
other benefits are foregone. This kind of a dynamic should be
present in all strongly conformist societies where the economic
rewards of conformity decrease while key social ideals remain the
same.
Consistent with this prediction, it appears that a significant
number of young people in Japan have adapted to the asymmetric
labor market changes precisely through moving toward ritual-
ism (Figure 2). In other words, they have continued to strive to
conform to dominant cultural expectations despite a dramatically
lower likelihood of receiving the rewards that the previous gener-
ations could expect for following the same cultural prescriptions.
An expanded portion of youth undergo high education – over 50%
of high school graduates now graduate 4-year universities – but up
to a fifth of even this well-educated group acquiesces to insecure,
low-paid jobs7. A fourth of all 25- to 34-year-olds find themselves
7Approximately 20% of fresh university graduates could not find a stable job at the
end the 2000s compared to just 7% in 1992 (Ministry of Education, 2010).
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FIGURE 2 |The predicted flow of young people between adaptive
categories in globalizing conformist societies such as Japan.
stuck in non-standard employment without important culturally
valued rewards. Those in this group are at risk of foregoing (1)
a decent income8; (2) essential occupational skills (since train-
ing takes place mainly on the job in Japan; Genda, 2005); (3) full
social security benefits; (4) all-important organizational member-
ship (see Brinton, 2011); (5) the social status of an adult fulltime
worker (shakaijin; literally, “a member of society”); and (6) the
opportunity to form a family9. Significant psychological distress
is often suffered as a result. Puzzlingly, despite such major dis-
advantages, most ritualists continue to work in the (peripheral)
labor force10. One reason for this is clearly that Japan’s dualized
labor markets make it extremely difficult to move inwards from
the margins into the core labor force, resembling other CMEs
like Germany and Italy in this respect. The culturally and institu-
tionally conformist landscape further serves to keep ritualists in
their place by making innovation – the deployment of alterna-
tive means while aiming for conventional life goals, for example
through entrepreneurship or art – basically impossible. Despite all
this, related protest movements remain surprisingly weak (though
they are now possibly strengthening following recent anti-poverty
rallies and the March 2011 tsunami and nuclear crises).
However, there are some youth who do move out of the labor
markets altogether, whether by choice or inevitability. In journal-
istic and academic commentary on Japan, the phenomenon of
8According to the Cabinet Office of Japan, non-standard workers earn roughly 85%
of what their standard-worker contemporaries do in the early 20s, but only about
60% in their early 40s.
9There are important gender differences here. Shirahase (2009) documents the sig-
nificantly lower likelihood of non-standard male workers (freeters), compared to
their standard-worker contemporaries, to marry and form families.
10Existing studies show that only a small minority manage to move from here
into permanent positions partly because employers view prolonged non-standard
employment in a starkly negative light (Kosugi, 2008).
social withdrawal (hikikomori) has attracted considerable atten-
tion since the early 2000s (Zielenziger, 2006; Horiguchi, 2011).
In Mertonian terms, socially withdrawn youth can be positioned
as retreatists who have become disillusioned with both dominant
goals and legitimate means. It should be mentioned here that such
youth emerged as a major social problem in Japan during ris-
ing youth unemployment: 10% of 20- to 24-year-olds were out
of work in 2003 – double the rate of the early 1990s (Statistics
Bureau, 2011). The following section proceeds to consider the
motivational processes of social withdrawees by reference to orig-
inal experimental data, after which we tentatively examine more
actively non-conformist adaptive patterns.
ATYPICAL MOTIVATIONAL PATTERNS AND AVOIDANCE
BEHAVIORS
In order to understand the peculiar situation of socially with-
drawn youth in Japan, it is helpful to begin by contrasting typical
Japanese psychological patterns with American ones. Previous cul-
tural psychological studies on motivational differences (Kitayama
et al., 1997; Heine et al., 1999; Morling et al., 2002) suggest that
Japanese society forms an “interdependent cultural system” where
individuals pay significant attention to their own shortcomings.
They do so in order to improve themselves so that they can
meet conformist expectations, therefore maintaining social har-
mony. By contrast, in an “independent cultural system” like that
of the United States, individuals tend to be motivated to enhance
their own self-perceived uniqueness so as to reinforce what they
perceive to be positive attributes which already exist within them-
selves. This translates to Americans typically working harder in
response to their own successes relative to their failures, while
Japanese tend to work harder in response to failures relative to
successes. Indeed, Heine et al. (2001) found precisely these cross-
culturally divergent motivational patterns in an experimental
study.
Recently, Norasakkunkit and Uchida (in press) replicated Heine
and colleague’s study by comparing motivational patterns between
Japanese university students at risk of becoming retreatists and
Japanese university students likely to be conformists (low-risk
group) according to their own self-reported attitudes as measured
by a not in employment, education, or training (“NEET”) Risk
Scale developed by Uchida and Norasakkunkit (in preparation).
As expected, low-risk students, much like the Japanese sample in
Heine and colleagues’ study, worked harder in response to receiv-
ing failure feedback relative to receiving success feedback, while
this motivational pattern was reversed for high-risk students. Fur-
thermore, Uchida and Norasakkunkit also found that high-risk
students scored lower on core values of interdependence than
low-risk students, suggesting that they might be “deviants” in the
context of Japan’s interdependent cultural system.
These findings suggest that although the motivational pat-
tern found among high-risk Japanese students was similar to that
of North American students reported in Heine and colleagues’
study, a closer look at how “retreatist” tendencies were associated
with motivation suggested something different. While, in contrast
with the typical Japanese motivational pattern, retreatist tenden-
cies were associated with lower motivation to work hard in the
failure feedback condition, such tendencies were not necessarily
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associated with increased motivation to work hard in the suc-
cess feedback condition (Norasakkunkit and Uchida, in press).
In a separate survey study of actual retreatist groups11 as well
as North American students and Japanese students, Uchida and
Norasakkunkit (in preparation) found that the retreatist groups
scored lower on both core values of interdependence and core
values of independence relative to low-risk Japanese students and
relative to North American students. Norasakkunkit and Uchida
(in press) therefore concluded that the attitudes and motiva-
tional patterns of retreatist groups (and those at risk of becoming
“NEET”) represent more of a deviation from interdependence
than a movement toward independence. Put another way, the devi-
ation in attitudes and motivational patterns among the retreatist
and at risk groups is more a function of being cultural dropouts
(or, in the case of high-risk students, believing that one is likely to
become a cultural dropout) than a function of actively embrac-
ing alternative motivational patterns or attitudes. Thus, socially
and occupationally inactive youth in Japan should be understood
primarily as emerging from the growing rift between culturally
dominant goals and the institutional means for supporting goals
such as permanent employment – in line with the sociological
analysis given in the previous section – and less as a consequence of
personal preference or individual psychopathology (Uchida et al.,
2010).
To relate these finding to Cheng and Chiu’s theory of reactions
to globalization, it seems that retreatists in Japan have disso-
ciated themselves from core cultural values of interdependence
and therefore have no reason to exhibit “hot” reactions toward
globalization pressures. Their reactions are instead characterized
by avoidance behaviors. Moreover, since it is likely that their fam-
ily expectations and educational experiences have consistently
encouraged adherence to certain legitimate means and standard
social roles (as discussed earlier), they probably have had very little
exposure to alternative modes of agency or success. Hence, as long
as they remain retreating, they may never develop an agency that
is either independent or interdependent.
Next, we turn to examining more deeply how specific modes of
adaptation are distributed among Japanese youth. In the preceding
section we pointed out that, in the face of means-goals tensions,
alongside retreatist responses (e.g., withdrawing) and ritualism,
one also expects to see “acting out” behaviors such as innova-
tive activities or organized protests. However, as existing studies
in the cultural divergence of motivational processes show, modes
of deviation appear to be unevenly distributed in favor of with-
drawing behaviors in the Japanese cultural context. This is not
necessarily surprising since earlier cultural psychological accounts
have argued that the frequency of the two broad self-regulatory
motivations, approach motivations, and avoidance motivations
(Higgins, 1997; Elliot, 1999), tend to be unevenly distributed across
cultures (Hamamura et al., 2009). “Approach motivations” are
11These comprised 28 young adults who had been socially withdrawn for 6 months
or more (i.e., in regular contact with no other people except their parental families)
and 433 “NEET” youth who were officially out of the labor force. Both groups were
aged 15–34. See Toivonen (Forthcoming) regarding the introduction of the “NEET”
category to Japan in the mid-2000s and the peculiar youth support measures that
followed.
characterized by behaviors that are oriented toward a positive or
a desirable event or possibility, such as being extroverted so as to
make new friends. “Avoidance motivations,” on the other hand, are
characterized by behaviors that are oriented toward pre-empting
an undesirable event or possibility, such as being introverted to
avoid offending someone.
Hamamura and colleagues argue that the frequency of these
strategies varies across cultures because what it takes to be func-
tional and successful varies according to cultural context. In North
America, for example, because high self-esteem is especially desir-
able and functional, the benefits of actualizing approach motiva-
tions that help to maintain high self-esteem (e.g., asserting one’s
positive attributes to others) outweigh the cost of potentially caus-
ing disturbance to social harmony. By contrast, in a conformist,
interdependent cultural context like mainstream Japan, maintain-
ing “face” is crucial to one’s success and functionality. As it is
much easier to lose face than it is to gain it, avoidance strategies
(such as behaving inconspicuously) are attractive since they can
effectively safeguard against the loss of face. Indeed, Hamamura
and colleagues provided experimental evidence to suggest that
Japanese are more attentive to avoidance-oriented information
while North Americans are more attentive to approach-oriented
information.
In light of this, we argue that withdrawing behavior represents
an expression of avoidance motivations. Consistent with the logic
explained above, withdrawing as a mode of deviance is in impor-
tant respects less costly than acting out in the Japanese cultural
context. This cultural psychological perspective can account for
why deviant Japanese youth are more prone to “asocial” rather
than “anti-social” behaviors. It does not predict the complete
absence of anti-social behavior – or of democratically oriented,
agentic student movements as seen in late 1960s Japan – but it
implies such behavior will be significantly more muted compared
to socio-economically similar but independence-oriented cultural
conditions.
These findings suggest that there is a general tendency for indi-
viduals to be more risk-averse than risk-taking in interdependent
cultural contexts like Japan. It is therefore that much more diffi-
cult to overtly and one-sidedly push for structural and ideological
adjustments in response to globalization pressures, especially when
change pressures are perceived to threaten norms and practices of
interdependence, social harmony, and adherence to hierarchy. On
the societal level, “hot” reactions to globalization are therefore
likely to persist under such socio-ecological conditions even if it
comes at a high cost to economic growth and breeds economic
insecurity for the middle-classes and young adults.
Since behavior is guided more by avoidance motivations and
less by approach motivations in the Japanese cultural context, ritu-
alism, and retreatism can be expected to be the default individual-
level responses whenever conformity – as a result of wide-scale
socio-economic change, for example – becomes difficult to attain.
On this point the sociological theory and psychological evidence
that we have presented point in the same direction. However, it
would clearly be incorrect to argue that the salience of avoidance
motivations always leads to only ritualist or retreatist individual-
level adaptations in the face of globalization. We next turn to
discuss an alternative type of adaptation.
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“COOL” ADAPTATIONS BY TACTFUL YOUTH?
Indeed, despite the presence of heavy cultural and institutional
constraints, less conformist individuals do exist in Japan and
some of them have found creative ways to negotiate life and
work in globalizing society. In our Mertonian scheme, these non-
conformists fall into the category of “mavericks” (Figure 2) that
stands outside the framework of dominant cultural goals and
institutionalized means. We hypothesize that, in the absence of
large-scale revolution or new mass movements, they are the most
likely group of young adults to actively shape social change, includ-
ing more sustainable adaptations to globalization. This is because
those who remain in one of the other adaptive categories (con-
formism, ritualism, and retreatism) lack the interest, skill and/or
potential to re-configure the existing system as its beneficiaries,
consumers, or outcasts. But what forms are maverick behavior
likely to take in conformist, interdependence-oriented social and
cultural contexts?
Famously, the most conspicuous maverick of 2000s Japan was
Horie Takafumi, a talented Tokyo University graduate who came to
be known for his aggressive trading practices, take-over bids and
the Livedoor Incident (2006) that eventually led to a two-and-
a-half-year prison sentence for securities fraud, put into effect
just as this article was being finalized in late June 2011. Horie’s
case is instructive because he had few qualms about challeng-
ing entrenched Japanese business interests, including those of the
Japan Broadcasting Corporation and its elderly owners. His antics
flew in the face of convention: by amassing a fortune by his late
twenties, he challenged the seniority-based social model, and by
attacking large conservative corporations, he exemplified the val-
ues of unbridled competition, individualism, and creativity. Horie
in effect embodied the ethos of US-inspired global capitalism that
was felt to be a threat by influential parts of the Japanese business
world. Not surprisingly, he met with fierce resistance from the
establishment, leaving some pundits believing that he was crushed
by vested interests and punished disproportionately for the fraud
he allegedly committed. While many young people looked to Horie
as an iconic role model (Fackler, 2011), his defeat sent the depress-
ing message to aspiring youth that it was simply not worth trying
anything new in Japan’s change-resistant enterprise environment.
Horie’s misadventures highlight a critical dilemma faced by
conformist societies: whenever their mainstream institutions and
elites react to globalization in predominantly hot ways, cool and
integrative adaptations by individuals and firms are resisted and
held back by less adapted but powerful elements. This dynamic
has, according to Schoppa (2006), possibly accelerated the mass
exit from Japan of leading manufacturers, which could have been
partly prevented via reasonable domestic reforms. Actors who
develop new values and methods to cope in new conditions there-
fore find themselves in the tricky position of having to “resist the
resistance”to globalization – or leave. But with the weight of main-
stream society so formidable, open resistance can prove difficult
to even highly skilled individuals (such as Horie).
This is partly why another quieter variety of young leaders in
Japan has opted to negotiate conformist pressures in less explicit
yet effective ways. Social entrepreneurs in various fields present
a pertinent example here. These are highly ambitious, socially
motivated individuals who lead flexible non-profit organizations
and small for-profit companies. Kudo Kei, the well-connected
manager of the brand-conscious youth work group Sodate-age
Netto (Toivonen, 2009) and Komazaki (2007), the chief of the
NPO Florence that provides temporary care to ill children, are
two widely known cases in point. Importantly, instead of being
openly confrontational with the state, local governments, and
existing corporations, they seek to strategically engage such insti-
tutions, promoting their own unconventional ideas as “inno-
vations” and “solutions” to social problems. Such young lead-
ers (1) articulate original ideas and social visions; (2) employ
original methods; (3) craft implicit strategies to challenge the
status quo; (4) incorporate internationally diffused ideas (such
as “self-efficacy” and “social inclusion”); and (5) fuse “Japan-
ese” and “global” values (such as interdependence and indepen-
dence)12. These characteristics are consistent with our concep-
tion of quiet mavericks (Figure 2) as well as cool responses
to globalization, offering us a snapshot of what more creative
and integrative adaptations may look like in an intensely con-
formist society. With a growing number of Japanese-language
publications on social entrepreneurship (see, e.g., Watanabe, 2005;
Ooshima, 2009) and with elite youth beginning to view it as a
dream occupation (interview with Kaneko Ikuta, June 27, 2011),
we may soon witness a significant increase in quiet mavericks in
Japan.
Of course, it is likely that such mavericks exist in a wide vari-
ety of domains, from online trading to art, fashion, and various
for-profit businesses. Relevantly, existing research on entrepre-
neurship in Japan has noted that individual entrepreneurs, while
in a position to exercise leadership, are far more group-oriented
and far less aggressive in their behavior than their European or
American counterparts (Richter, 2000, pp. 160–161; Miyamoto
and Wilken, 2010). This seems to confirm our view that, if we are
to look for change makers in advanced conformist societies, we
should pay attention not only to examples like Horie but also to
young adults who are less conspicuous yet highly tactful as they
enact social change.
Assuming that youth can move between the four main cat-
egories set out in our schema of individual-level adaptations,
where do quiet mavericks come from? Interestingly, it seems prob-
able that they mainly comprise those who have first mastered
the role of the conformist, for it is (ex-)conformists – not ritu-
alists or retreatists – who possess the social capital (networks),
psychological resources, and interpersonal skills that make it pos-
sible for them to strategically shift toward the role of a successful
maverick. It makes sense also that such youth should possess post-
materialist values (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2005 again) as they
have grown up in affluent conditions, and that they are the group
that has the greatest potential to act on such values of open-
ness, tolerance of diversity, and self-actualization. New empirical
research is required to fully understand the characteristics and
12This is not to suggest that “successful” adaptation can never be critical toward
the state, corporations, or global capitalism. Anti-capitalism activists, for exam-
ple, resemble social entrepreneurs in that they too draw on internationally diffused
ideas and discourses. However, activists usually need to be ready to deploy more
confrontational tactics than “quiet mavericks,” which means fewer youth in an
interdependence-based culture are likely to join their ranks.
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strategies of such inconspicuous mavericks, but we believe it is
this group that may drive the development of new working prac-
tices and alternative notions of successful careers in conformist,
interdependence-oriented societies challenged by globalization.
SUMMARY
How have Japanese youth adapted their motivational processes
and behaviors amid globalization-related cultural as well as insti-
tutional pressures? We began our analysis by noting how Japanese
elites exhibited mainly“hot”reactions to globalization in the 1990s
and 2000s: they reformed the labor markets asymmetrically by
protecting the core of the employment system, a dominant cul-
tural symbol, while expanding the insecure peripheral labor force.
Second, we found that those youth (ritualists) who were unable to
become true conformists tended to remain in peripheral employ-
ment that rarely yields culturally expected rewards such as a stable
income and good marriage prospects. We then focused specif-
ically on those who move to retreatism as social withdrawees.
Experimental data indicated that this group represents a deviation
from central Japanese cultural values (interdependence), though
without a clear movement toward Western motivational patterns
(independence). This finding is interesting in light of a strong
tendency to problematize and medicalize the hikikomori in Japan
(see the excellent review by Horiguchi, 2011). Indeed, our data
lends further support to the view that, rather than a pathology,
withdrawal reflects the increasing marginalization of young peo-
ple in the Japanese labor markets, leading to weaker socialization
in terms of dominant Japanese work practices (but without com-
pensatory socialization into alternative values or modes of action).
Withdrawees can thus be viewed as the disempowered victims of
the elites’ hot reactions to globalization.
We furthermore offered a cultural psychological perspective
for why avoidance motivations are so prevalent among Japanese
youth. Consistent with our sociological analysis, this predicted that
youth who cannot conform to standard life-course expectations
(e.g., due to decreasing access to stable jobs) are likely to become
ritualists or retreatists. Yet we also tentatively identified an actively
non-conformist group (quiet mavericks). The features of this still
insufficiently researched group hints at what “cool,” or creative
and integrative, adaptations to globalization may look like at the
individual level in conformist societies. However, that “quiet mav-
ericks” are required to be so agile, tactful, and culturally sensitive
underscores the considerable difficulty of adapting well amid con-
tradictory cultural pressures. It is clear that more research needs to
be conducted to better understand the backgrounds, values, and
trajectories of this group.
As our broad sociological frame, we relied on a four-fold
Mertonian scheme that helps to illuminate particularly well the
predicament of present-day Japanese youth: they are required to
grapple with a growing gap between unchanging cultural goals
and increasingly elusive institutional means. For the time being,
this means-ends discrepancy remains acute, though once norma-
tive goals become too far-removed from lived realities – reaching a
tipping point of sorts – it is likely that they will rapidly transform
and diversify.
What are the implications of this account to globalizing con-
formist societies more generally? Perhaps the most obvious point is
that, as social and economic change accelerates, conformist soci-
eties that are rigid and hierarchical may well fail an ever-larger
segment of their youth. Clearly, the culturally defined goals and
means that youth are required to conform to change too slowly
to match the lived realities of young people who face shifting
social structures. What makes swift adaptation particularly hard
is the vast distance and oppositional relationship between global
(independence-oriented) and local (interdependence-oriented)
values. Less obviously, since most youth are encouraged to con-
form rather than to vocally air their grievances, there is only
a weak push to reform values and institutions that no longer
work for a significant minority (see Schoppa, 2006 on how a
similar dynamic is affecting working women and large manu-
facturers). The demographic marginalization of young adults in
the context of a radically aging society (Figure 1) may further
weaken the force of reform pressures. Of course, a host of other
variables may be relevant here, including the extent to which a
country is oriented toward domestic rather than international
markets, which is something that could be considered in future
studies (especially those comparing Japan with South Korea and
Taiwan).
Can these dilemmas be overcome? The pessimist might con-
clude that rapid globalization renders conformist societies and
their interdependence-oriented cultural systems simply unviable.
More optimistically, it may be possible to consciously promote
“cool” – i.e., reflective and integrative – responses to globaliza-
tion over “hot” ones among youth as well as decision-makers.
This can be expected to be difficult where influential discourses
(such as the Nihonjin-ron, or theories of Japaneseness, discourse
in Japan) emphasize dichotomous distinctions between what is
“foreign” – and hence negative – and what is “indigenous” – and
hence superior. Yet public discourse can in theory frame differ-
ences not only in oppositional terms but positively as catalysts
to creativity and synthesis. As Cheng and Chiu (2010) suggest
in an earlier study on the psychological consequences of global-
ization, “when the situation emphasizes appropriating ideas from
diverse cultures as intellectual forces to foster creative problem
solving, simultaneous activation of cultural representations may
facilitate the development of the expertise in creative concep-
tual expansion” (Chiu and Cheng, 2007). Although the issues
highlighted by the analysis in this paper are highly complex and
point to various policy implications, the success of conformist
societies – including Japan’s East Asian neighbors South Korea
and Taiwan – that face intense globalization pressures may now
hinge not on whether they can embrace global values in an
uncritical sense, but on whether they can cultivate “cool” cul-
tural and institutional adaptations among their citizenry and
leaders.
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